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Abstract: Aristotle emphasises the role of habituation in our acquiring moral virtues, as 
well as other abilities. I discuss an independently engaging problem concerning the 
acquisition of abilities through practice, formulated in the context of Aristotle’s account of 
virtue development. The problem consists in a tension between two plausible claims, one [A] 
concerning what is required for an agent to be acting on a decision, the other [B] concerning 
the view a novice should have of whether they could ever possible be making the decisions 
required for moral development. I recommend a solution: the self-blind novice response. That 
solution implies that self-blindness should be pervasive among Aristotelian moral developers. 
And that implication is confirmed by the fact that the necessarily rare state of self-aware 
expertise is an important part of the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity. 
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1. The paper 
 
I will discuss a problem concerning ability acquisition which I think is both general and 
independently engaging. In particular I consider its application within the framework of 
Aristotle’s account of virtue acquisition: that we acquire virtues by habituation or practice 
(NE 2.1 1103a17-18; NE 2.1 and 2.4 for fuller discussion); that we acquire a virtue (as we 
acquire some other skills, abilities or habits) “by first exercising it” (NE 2.1, 1103a31)1.  
 
First some preliminaries. The details of Aristotle’s account of the virtues (and their 
acquisition) are disputed. I want as far as possible to remain neutral on contentious 
interpretative questions though. Problems threaten in three main areas. First, discussion of a 
problem framed in terms of Aristotle’s account of virtue acquisition had better get that 
account right. Second, my discussion will focus on Aristotle’s notion of decision 
(prohairesis) and so I had better get that notion right too. Third, virtue acquisition is a 
prolonged process and – intuitively – doesn’t end when a child ‘comes of age’. I will be 
interested in the later stages of that process, where someone might be fairly reflectively 
engaged in their own moral development. But it might seem that Aristotle doesn’t allow for 
much in the way of mature moral development. So that seems problematic. 
 
                                               
1 In what follows translations typically follow Ross/Urmson 1984 (in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The 
Revised Oxford Translation), with departures indicated. Alternative translations are Irwin 1999, Rowe 2002 
(Broadie/Rowe 2002) and Taylor 2006.  
What Aristotle says at NE 2.1 is that moral virtue (arête êthikê) comes about through habit (ethos: Rowe 2002 
prefers “habituation”). And the title of this paper adverts to that standard translation. But I will typically talk 
instead about acquiring a virtue through practice, and will not often use the term ‘habit’ or its cognates. 
What characterises acquiring a virtue or developing an ability or learning a skill... through practice is that we 
acquire the virtue, ability, skill... “by first exercising it” (NE 2.1, 1103a31). At NE 2.1, 1103b21-22 Aristotle 
gives a crisp statement of the essential feature of state-acquisition through practice: “states arise out of like 
activities’). I will often refer summarily to this process as one in which someone acquires the ability to φ 
through φ-ing. That formula sounds fine for lots of the examples Aristotle provides and I use – someone 
acquires the ability to play the flute by playing the flute, someone learns to heal by healing etc. But it doesn’t fit 
well with our natural ways of talking about virtue acquisition. There are two points. First virtues are normally 
referred to by abstract nouns (‘courage’, ‘good-humour’). But what a virtue is (as Aristotle recognises, and as 
the formula requires) is a state  or disposition (a hexis, NE 2.5, 1106a10-12 ; see Cat 8, 8b26-9a14 for more on 
the notion). Second, in addition to the unwieldy reference to a virtue as a disposition to φ there is the problem of 
providing an easy reference for φ. In lots of cases of acquisition by practice φ stands for what it is that the ability 
(disposition, skill...) is an ability to do. I acquire the ability to build through building. But there is generally no 
non-trivial way of specifying what a virtue like courage is a disposition to do – courage is the disposition to be 
courageous. These two points combine to make application of the formula acquires the ability to φ through φ-
ing to the case of the virtues sound inevitably clumsy. But the underlying point should be clear. What it means 
to say that courage is acquired by practice is that someone acquires the disposition to act courageously by acting 
courageously (NE 2.1, 1103a34-1103b2; 2.4, 1105a17-19). 
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How can I hope to remain neutral? The idea is that my argument will reply only on some 
pretty uncontentious (perhaps because loosely stated) points about Aristotle’s views.  
 
The first uncontentious point is that virtues issue in decisions, that a virtuous person will 
(quite often) act in ways which express a decision; that a virtue is a ‘prohairetic state.2’ So, 
contrast a youngster who does not yet possess some virtue and the developed person who 
does possess that virtue. The former will not, while the latter will (sometimes) act in ways 
which express decisions appropriate to that virtue. So the practice or habituation by which an 
agent acquires a virtue will take that person from a state in which they cannot, to a state in 
which they (often) do, express the appropriate decisions in action. 
 
The second is that decision is closely connected with, and in some way involves, 
deliberation
3
. 
 
And the third is that there are limits on what can be deliberated about; an agent’s deliberation 
is constrained by what that agent believes they can achieve by their own efforts; I cannot 
deliberate about what I know I will not succeed in doing
4
.  
 
Now a more substantive move. Since decision involves deliberation and there are constraints 
on deliberation there are therefore the same constraints on decision as there are on 
deliberation. What does that mean? I mean that if I know that, in acting in a certain way I will 
not be X-ing, then I cannot, in acting in that way, be expressing a decision to X. Further if 
expression of a decision to X in the appropriate circumstances is what is generally required 
for the X virtue, and I know that in acting as I am in such circumstances I am not expressing 
a decision to X, then I ipso facto know that I do not possess the X virtue.  
 
Back to contentious issues in Aristotelian scholarship. The argument in this paper could do 
with examples. And, as is well known, Aristotle liked to use crafts as an example in talking 
about virtues. But there are also important differences between crafts and virtues, as Aristotle 
recognises, and it is a matter of debate how much weight Aristotle puts on those differences 
                                               
2 See NE 2.4 passim 
 
3 See NE 3.2-3 passim 
 
4
 NE 3.3, 1112a28-30, 1112a33-34, 1112b24-28; NE 6.2, 1139b5-8; NE 6.5, 1140a30-32. 
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in his account of the virtues. Will it then be safe for me to appeal to craft examples as often as 
I do? I think the answer is yes, so long as two conditions hold. First that the deliberation 
involved (in whatever way) in craft decisions is subject to the same constraints as the 
deliberation involved (in whatever other way) in virtue decisions. Second that all that is 
required for the problem I will talk about is that the deliberation involved in virtue decisions 
be subject to the constraint that I cannot deliberate about what I know I will not succeed in 
doing. I think those two conditions do hold, and I hope that will be clear as I go on. So I will 
use the crafts as an example. But not my only example. My other favourite is the new parent 
developing parental virtues through practice. At one point in time people don’t possess the 
parental virtues (they aren’t parents). At a later time many do possess them. So it seems that 
many people do acquire parental virtues; and the most obvious way is through parenting, 
habituation and practice. But this type of virtue acquisition, occurring later in life and perhaps 
involving some reflection seems un-Aristotelian
5. What to say? Well, if Aristotle’s own 
conception of virtue acquisition concentrates almost entirely on virtue acquisition in the 
young, and cannot be adapted to accommodate virtues which are acquired by practice at a 
more mature stage, then for me at least it begins to lose its philosophical interest. We lead 
safer and more compartmentalised lives than the citizens of a Greek polis. I cannot honestly 
say that I have ever been in a situation which would require an exercise of Aristotelian 
courage, I have had an easy life. But there is of course the phenomenon of people 
recognising, eg as a political situation develops, that courage is increasingly called for 
(looming political dangers, the real possibility of a military draft, courage required in 
deciding whether to fight or to refuse the draft etc). What we hope is that Aristotle’s – an 
Aristotelian – account of virtue acquisition should be able to accommodate that sort of case, 
even if rare for an Athenian citizen. And of course it can. There are continuities between the 
trials I have endured and predictable situations which will genuinely require the virtue of 
courage. The acquisition of the parental virtues through parenting differs from this case only 
in being a more striking example, since the discontinuities between not being a parent and 
being a parent are so much more radical than those between the annoying trials I’ve faced so 
far and situations calling for courage. But it is equally a case in which people really do 
acquire virtues as their lives continue. 
 
                                               
5 As might seem obvious from Aristotle’s texts. See eg NE 2.1, 1103b24-26 “It makes no small difference, then, 
whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather 
all the difference.”  
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2. The Problem 
 
The problem I am interested in is this. If we conceive of practice as we have to in order for it 
to inculcate virtue, we are committed to two conflicting claims: 
[A] If someone knows that in doing F they will not be X-ing well then their doing F 
cannot express a decision to X 
and 
[B] In acquiring the X-related virtue(s) through practice someone must often act in ways 
which express a decision to X while knowing that they will not succeed in X-ing well. 
 
What is meant by the weasel phrase conceive of practice as we have to in order for it to 
inculcate virtue? The thought is that the ‘practice’ which will inculcate virtue can’t remain 
externally driven. It might start out that way, but if the novice is eventually to be able to make 
decisions characteristic of the X-virtue then at some stage they have to ‘give it a genuine 
shot’, ‘have a go for themselves’, act authentically, as it were: what they have to do, I will 
claim, is make decisions for themselves. Consider the new parent. At some stage they have to 
act for themselves, without relying on the childcare book, webpage or friend (more than they 
should)
6
. 
 
So now a bit more detail on what is involved in making a decision, and acting in a way which 
expresses a decision. As mentioned, the important point here is that decision involves 
deliberation, and that deliberation involves looking for appropriate or effective ways of 
behaving, with something further in view. Aristotle says that a decision involves a wish 
(boulêsis) for some end, accompanied by deliberation about ‘the things towards the ends’7. A 
decision is a certain type of desire: a deliberative desire, a rationally generated desire, an 
                                               
6 Compare the sullen parent, who isn’t really on board with the childcare project at all. Mere stubborn repetition 
of something they’ve been told to do (‘look, that’s how you change a nappy’) won’t do anything to make them a 
good parent. The contrast, and the idea of ‘acting authentically’, should be familiar. If I am to develop the ability 
to play chess, I have to ‘play properly’ as it were: I have make moves with the aim of winning. Moving pieces in 
order to reproduce openings I have learned from books, or in order to impress my teacher, won’t help me 
develop the ability to play chess. Or if a student is to become good at philosophy, then she has from the very 
start to approach the subject seriously, and give genuine answers to the questions she is faced with. Suppose the 
question for an early tutorial is whether euthanasia is permissible. A student whose aim in answering that 
question is accurately to reproduce points which have been made in lectures is not thereby on the road to 
becoming a good philosopher. What the student needs to aim at is getting to the bottom of that question.   
 
7 NE 3.3 1112b12 ta pros ta telê 
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intellectual desire
8
. A decision is a desire to perform some action which results from working 
out (through deliberation) that that the prospective action is the only or best way to achieve 
some aim. Aristotle says that a doctor does not deliberate about whether, but about how, to 
heal
9
. The point is that a discipline like healing (X-ing) considered in itself has an internal 
goal describable as healing well (X-ing well). In some cases X-ing well will come to 
obtaining some good product of the appropriate sort (someone builds well when they produce 
good houses). In other cases that will not be so – parenting well, acting well in danger, living 
well aren’t a matter of producing anything10. Now insofar as someone is engaged in the 
discipline they do not deliberate about whether to engage in it well
11
. So the (relevant) 
deliberations of the doctor, builder, new parent...will have the following sort of structure: 
‘given that I want to build well and construct the house as designed, I need to provide support 
for a large roof, and therefore to build strong walls; so the walls have to be thick, and 
therefore I need mortar which is strong but slow to set, and slightly flexible; a good way to 
get that would be by mixing cement, sand and water in (roughly) these proportions; so now I 
need to ...’12. When these deliberations bring me to something which is immediately open to 
me, and when I act accordingly (I actually do mix cement, sand and water in the proportions 
optimal for mortar of the required consistency), then my action expresses a decision.  
                                               
 
8 NE 6.2, 1139b4-5 
 
9 NE 3.3, 1112b11-15.  
 
10 See the contrast at NE 6.4 between making (poiêsis) and acting (praxis). Describing the internal goal of the X-
activity as X-ing well is intended as a way of saying something which will capture both those (very different) 
cases. 
 
11 This doesn’t involve denying either of the following two points. First, someone might deliberate about eg 
whether to become a builder in the first place, and about whether to preserve their skill and remain a builder (as 
opposed, for example, to allowing it to be lost through lack of activity). Second, a skilled builder might 
deliberate about whether to do some building right now rather than, for example, taking the day off. But what 
we have in each of those cases is deliberation about whether to pursue the internal goal of building, and such 
deliberation will compare the advantages and disadvantages of building (I get paid, but on the other hand it is 
hard work) with the advantages and disadvantages of some alternative (the weather is warm and it would be nice 
to lie on the beach, but on the other hand I have bills to pay) relative to some further role with its own internal 
goal (I am a parent, and a parent does not deliberate about whether to support his children).  
Note that these remarks are intended only to support the weak claim that if I do deliberate about whether to 
acquire or exercise some ability, then that deliberation must be relative to some further goal which is being held 
fixed. I am steering clear of the much more difficult – and much discussed – question of whether it is possible to 
deliberate about one’s ultimate goals. NE 1.4, 1095a17-22 suggests that there is an internal goal to living a 
human life which can be schematically characterised as being happy, living and doing well. The problems arise 
when we consider Aristotle’s position on the question of whether and how someone can deliberate about what 
the pursuit of happiness or living well would be for them, either in general or in the immediate circumstances. 
 
12 See NE 3.3, 1112b15-19; for a case of medical deliberation Met Z 7, 1032b5-22; compare the practical 
syllogism at MA 7, 701a18-23. 
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Suppose that’s a good enough explication, at least as far as it goes, of what it is for an action 
to express a decision. Then we are in a position to assess the plausibility of each of [A] and 
[B]. For if one or both of [A] and [B] were implausible, then we should conclude that the 
implausible one is false, in which case no interesting tension would arise between [A] and 
[B]. 
 
Why then should [A] seem plausible? Here is one line of argument. As mentioned, the crucial 
point is that decision involves deliberation, and there are constraints on what we can 
deliberate about – in particular, I can only deliberate about what I can achieve by my own 
efforts. It follows then that I cannot deliberate about what I know I will not succeed in doing. 
Imagine a general who wants to command his troops well and win the battle (the internal goal 
of his expertise in military strategy). Suppose a certain action (eg ordering the troops on the 
left flank to advance) does seem possible to him (eg he can communicate with them). Still, 
that cannot be the only action which is possible for him. For if it is possible to order the 
troops on the left to advance then it will also be possible to order them to retreat or to remain 
where they are. Why then does the general order them to advance? Presumably because he 
has worked out that doing so is the only or the best way of achieving the internal goal of his 
military activity (namely to command the troops well and win the battle). But now suppose 
that he knows in advance that ordering the troops on the left to advance will not be 
commanding well and will not lead to winning the battle. In that case the link between the 
action which presents itself to the general as immediately possible (ordering the advance) and 
the desired goal from which he has worked backwards to the action (commanding well and 
winning the battle) is broken, since the general takes himself to know that ordering an 
advance will not be commanding well and will not lead to winning the battle. And if that were 
the case then the general’s military deliberations would never take him to the (feasible) 
option of ordering an advance. Now that can all be summed up by saying that if the general’s 
performing a certain action (ordering an advance) expresses a decision to X (to command 
well and win the battle) then it is not also the case that the general knows that in performing 
that action (ordering an advance) he will not succeed in X-ing (commanding well and 
winning the battle). And that claim is equivalent to (it is the contrapositive of) 
[A] If someone knows that in doing F they will not be X-ing well then their doing F 
cannot express a decision to F. 
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Here is another line of argument in support of [A]. Talk of an action expressing a decision to 
X is shorthand for a claim about the desire which motivates the action. An action which 
expresses a decision to X is motivated by a desire to X which results from working out 
through deliberation that that action is the best or only way to achieve the internal goal of X-
ing – namely to X well13. If a certain action – for example, fastening together in a particular 
way this many rafters made of that type of wood – expresses a decision to build a house then 
what motivates the action is that agent wants to fasten together these rafters in this way 
because it is feasible to do so and they have worked out that doing so is what’s required in 
order to support a roof of the type wanted for the house building project to hand, and 
therefore for completing the project well. Or again, if feeding the baby with this comforting 
food right now expresses a decision to parent well then it’s feasible (there’s food available) 
and the father has worked out that doing that is the best or only way to be a good parent. 
 
Suppose then that the locution express a decision to X in [A] is expanded in line with that 
explication to give  
[A1] If an agent knows that in doing F they will not be X-ing well then their doing F cannot 
be motivated by a desire to X which is the result of working out that doing F is the 
best or only way to achieve the goal of X-ing well 
[A1] is more unwieldy than [A], but its plausibility is more apparent. Consider the apprentice 
learning to build by building and the new parent, and take two episodes in their development. 
The apprentice is about to contribute something to the building project, to mix the mortar for 
the north wall; the parent is trying to get the baby to sleep. The possibility of a certain action 
presents itself – add a bit more sand to the mortar, give the baby more milk. The apprentice 
and the parent go for it. Now there is a perspective on that episode which is distinct from that 
                                               
13 But the converse isn’t true, namely that if an action is motivated by a desire to X which results from working 
out through deliberation that that action is the best or only way of X-ing well then that action expresses a 
decision to X. That cannot be right, in view of the Broadie/Anscombe point that the calculating akratic who 
pursues a neighbour’s partner in a shrewd and intelligent fashion is not nevertheless acting on a decision – 
indeed, qua akratic they are acting on appetite and against their decision. That’s to say that we need to be 
sensitive to the distinction between 
(a) if an action is motivated by a desire to X which results from working out ... then that action expresses a 
decision to X 
which is false, and  
(b) if an action expresses a decision to X then it is motivated by a desire to X which results from working out ... 
The second (b) is (at the least) less obviously false than (a), and is all that is required to sustain the argument 
which follows. Note that (b) is intended to be sufficiently loose to accommodate cases in which someone acts 
virtuously without immediately prior thought (NE 3.8, 1117a17-22) – perhaps make that clearer by adding a 
further qualification to (b) to give 
(b*) if an action expresses a decision to X then either it is motivated by a desire to X which results from 
working out that ..., or there would be such a motivating desire were the agent to work out that ...  
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of the apprentice or the new parent, namely the perspective of the expert, the person who 
does possess the virtue which the novice is seeking to acquire through practice – in this case, 
the master builder or the experienced good parent. In learning to build (by building), and 
learning to bring up a child (by bringing up a child) each of the apprentice and parent is 
consciously trying to acquire the ability or virtue which they conceive of the expert as 
possessing. Each considers the expert’s perspective as an ideal to which they aspire, and 
which they are seeking to attain. 
 
Now what the novice (apprentice or parent) has in fact done is opt to add more sand to the 
mortar, and give the baby more milk. What should the novice’s attitude be to the expert’s 
perspective on that situation?
14
 The novice wants to be able to alight on the option that the 
expert would alight on, and to do so in the way that the expert would – the apprentice wants 
to build well, the young father wants to parent well. That is exactly why they are engaged in 
acquiring the skills of the master builder or the virtues of the good and experienced parent. 
What the expert would do is to plump for the alternative which is sensitively optimised for 
the project at hand (eg the master builder would mix the mortar in light of an appreciation of 
what’s required for the immediate building project, of the differences that variations in the 
composition of mortar make to its properties, and of how much it matters to get it right, and 
to what degree of accuracy, at this stage of the job; likewise mutatis mutandis for the 
experienced good parent). But the novice knows that whichever option they went for (adding 
more sand, giving the baby more milk) will not in fact have been reached in that way, by 
sensitive optimisation for the project at hand, and as the result of building expertise or 
parental virtue – because the novice knows that they are not an expert, and so knows that they 
don’t have the expertise or virtue which would by definition inform an action which was the 
best option in the circumstances. To summarise: the novice wants to X well, that is, to X as 
the expert would; but the novice knows that she doesn’t have the expertise or virtue which 
would inform X-ing well (since she knows she is a novice)
15
; so the novice knows that she 
will not X well
16
. And what [A1] says – plausibly – is that given that the novice knows that in 
                                               
14 The fact that it is this question which brings out the plausibility of [A1] is significant. For more on this see the 
discussion later in the paper at section 3. 
 
15 See later for the significance of this point.  
 
16 See NE 2.4, 1105a26-30 “Again the case of the arts and that of the [virtues] are not similar; for the products of 
the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character, but if 
the acts that are in accordance with the [virtues] have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they 
are done justly or temperately”  
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doing such and such she will not be X-ing well, then her acting in that way (adding more 
sand, giving more milk) can’t be motivated by a desire which results from an expert’s 
deliberations about what building well or parenting well would be in these circumstances. For 
ex hypothesi the novice is not an expert. So the novice doesn’t have a full understanding of 
quite why and how adjusting the consistency of the mortar or giving the baby extra milk 
contributes as it does to building this house well or bringing up the baby well. And since the 
novice doesn’t have that understanding it follows that the novice hasn’t alighted on the 
particular action by appealing to that understanding in working out what it’s best to do. The 
novice’s action can’t be motivated by a deliberative desire – can’t express a decision – 
because the novice knows that they lack the expertise required to make a decision in this 
situation.   
 
Those are my arguments in support of [A]. But I may already have stumbled badly on an 
ambiguity in the idea that someone develops the X-virtue by acting as the expert would act. 
That idea covers two distinct claims regarding what someone needs to do in order to develop 
the X-virtue: 
(1) A novice developing the X virtue needs repeatedly to perform actions which are such 
that the expert would in fact also decide on those actions. 
(2) A novice developing the X virtue needs to make decisions in the way that the expert 
would make them. 
The fact that these are distinct is clear from NE 5.8, and in particular 1136a3-4: “Similarly, a 
man is just when he acts justly by [decision] (proelomenos ‘as a result of decision’, ‘if his 
decision causes him to do justice’), but he acts justly if he merely acts voluntarily”. And the 
distinction is crucial here. My two earlier arguments for [A] relied on assuming that 
Aristotle’s account of virtue acquisition commits him to (2). For they turned on the thought 
that if a novice knows that they are not an expert then they know that they will not make 
decisions in the way that the expert would make them. But one may doubt that Aristotle’s 
                                                                                                                                                  
It’s not that the novice knows that whatever they do will be different from what the expert would have done (it 
might turn out that the parent gives more milk, and in fact that’s exactly the thing to do). The parent is trying to 
develop parental virtue. and in that case – by contrast to the arts – the goodness is not just in the product. The 
new parent doesn’t just want the results of parental virtue (the outcomes which result from decisions which 
manifest parental virtue) – they want parental virtue. So, in effect, the question posed is: given that you are 
someone who is developing the parental virtues, do you think the action you are undertaking right now is an 
exercise of the parental virtues, ie a decision to parent well? And the plausible answer is: no, I know it isn’t an 
exercise of the parental virtue, because I know I don’t possess the parental virtues. 
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account of virtue acquisition does commit him to (2) as distinct from (1)
17
. (1) is weaker than 
(2), and in particular is far too weak to sustain my arguments for [A]. For even if a novice 
knows that they are not an expert, that gives them no reason to think that the action they 
perform (adding more sand, giving the baby milk) is different from the action which the 
expert would perform, even if it is an action which has been arrived at differently from the 
way in which the expert would arrive at it. The new parent gives the baby more milk, and 
perhaps that is precisely what the expert possessing the parental virtues would have done. So 
if acquisition of eg parental virtue requires only (1) – as opposed to (2) – then there will be no 
reason to suppose that [A] is a plausible claim about an Aristotelian account of virtue 
acquisition. 
 
Well, here’s an argument that Aristotle should be committed to (2) over and above (1). It 
rests on the thought that (1) leaves the phenomenon of virtue acquisition essentially 
mysterious in a way that (2) does not. I start from the following: 
This is why [decision] (prohairesis) cannot exist either without thought (nous) and 
intellect (dianoia) or without a moral state (êthikê hexis); for good action (eupraxia) 
and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect (dianoia) and character 
(ethos) 
NE 6.2, 1139a33-35 
Unsurprisingly the interpretation of this passage is disputed. But perhaps I can take from it 
the thought that someone who lacks a moral character of a certain type cannot make decisions 
                                               
17 This is to put it mildly. Isn’t it obvious from NE 2.4, 1105b5-10 that it’s (1) that Aristotle has in mind: 
“Action, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or temperate man would do; but it is 
not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate 
men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing 
temperate acts the temperate man.” 
And the argument which I offer is just the stubborn report that I don’t see how repeatedly performing actions 
which don’t express X-decisions can turn me into the sort of person who does express X-decisions. 
But at least the target is a bit clearer. What’s at issue here is not the desiring aspect of virtue. The question is not 
eg how can I come to be the sort of person who wants to behave courageously or temperately by repeatedly 
acting as a person who is courageous and temperate would act? There’s a familiar and plausible answer to that 
question concerning the internalisation of the pleasures of acting virtuously. The emphasis is rather on the 
intellectual aspect of decision. The question is rather: how can I come to be the sort of person who is able to act 
in ways that express decisions, that are sensitively optimised for the situation at hand, by repeatedly acting in 
ways which don’t express a decision, and which I don’t arrive at by sensitive optimisation for the situation at 
hand? And perhaps it’s not clear what the answer to that question is (which would be interesting). 
Notice that my examples are deliberately chosen to divert attention away from the connection of habituation to 
the desiderative aspect of virtue, and correspondingly towards the contribution of practice to the practical insight 
required for virtue, since they are examples in which it is easier to imagine the desiderative component given: 
the new parent who naturally wants to be a good parent, and who nevertheless develops parental virtue in the 
Aristotelian way through practice, becoming a good parent through acts of good parenting. Likewise I assume 
that the apprentice wants to be a good builder, that the chess novice wants to be a good player etc. 
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of the appropriate sort. A courageous person can make courage-expressive decisions and act 
accordingly, while someone who lacks a formed character as regards courage cannot. Now a 
novice is precisely someone who is developing a character of a certain sort. The young 
person does not yet have either a courageous or a cowardly character, the new parent is not 
yet either a good or a bad parent.  And that suggests that the novice does not act in ways that 
express the appropriate decisions
18
. In that case then an account of virtue acquisition needs to 
explain how an agent moves from repeatedly acting in ways that do not express a decision to 
X – ie from habituation and practice – to a condition in which they (sometimes) act in ways 
that do express a decision. Now consider the contrast between (1) and (2). Which of those 
more plausibly accommodates Aristotle’s formulaic statement of his account of virtue 
acquisition at NE 2.1, 1103b21-22: that “states arise out of like activities” (ek tôn homoiôn 
hexeis ginontai)? (1) gives Aristotle reason to say that  
(1*) repeatedly acting in ways that don’t express a decision to X can bring one to being the 
sort of person whose actions do express a decision to X 
whereas (2) would license 
(2*) repeatedly acting in ways that do express a decision to X can bring one to being the 
sort of person whose actions do express a decision to X. 
It is reasonable to think (isn’t it?) that (2*) cleaves closer to Aristotle’s formulaic statement 
that does (1*). To put in another way, (1*) leaves it a mystery how it is that repeatedly acting 
in one sort of way – a way that doesn’t express a decision to X – can result in a state of 
character which enables one to act in a significantly different sort of way – the way that does 
express a decision to X. (2*) on the other hand doesn’t involve that degree of mystery. (2*) 
requires only that we accept something, failure to recognise which is, according to Aristotle, 
‘the mark of a thoroughly senseless person’, namely that ‘it is from the exercise of activities 
on particular objects (tou energein peri hekasta that states of character (hai hexeis) are 
produced’ (NE 3.5, 1114a8-9). 
                                               
18 Does it? Consider some virtue (eg temperance). It can’t be true that it is only the temperate (or the indulgent 
or the insensible) who make decisions, since Aristotle says that the incontinent agent acts on the basis of 
appetite and against (contrary to) his decision – and that may suggest that the incontinent agent makes a 
decision, but fails to act on it. So it’s not true that its only people of settled character who make decisions. 
The argument above attempts to side-step this problem by talking of the agent who acts in ways that express 
decisions. And clearly that akratic doesn’t act in a way that accord with his decision. But this manoeuvre isn’t 
going to work, since the  continent agent does act in ways that express his decision, although he has to struggle 
against his appetites to do so: NE 3.2 1111b13-15 ‘Again, the incontinent man acts with appetite but not with 
[decision]; while the continent man on the contrary acts with [decision] , but not with appetite (proairoumenos 
men, epithumôn d’ ou)’.  And compare NE 7.1, 1145b13-14 ‘while the continent man, knowing that his 
appetities are bad, does not follow them because of his reason (dia ton logon).’ 
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It may seem though that this cannot be a good argument, since what is required by (2) and 
(2*) is patently paradoxical – namely that a novice, who cannot make the appropriate 
decisions, comes to be someone, an expert, who can make the appropriate decisions by means 
of repeatedly making the appropriate decisions. But the accusation of paradox is premature. 
For the issue of whether there is genuine paradox here is precisely the issue of whether [A] 
and [B] are genuinely in conflict. As we will see, I have a suggestion about how to resolve 
the conflict between [A] and [B] – the so-called Blind Novice Strategy – which suggestion 
will also remove the appearance of paradox from (2) and (2*).  
 
Where does this leave my arguments for [A]? The charge was that those arguments rely on an 
Aristotelian commitment to (2) rather than (1), whereas Aristotle is in fact committed only to 
(1) and not to (2). The argument of the preceding two paragraphs was intended to persuade 
you that an Aristotlelian should accept (2) and not just (1). If that argument was successful 
then perhaps my arguments for [A] and [B] also stand, but if I’m wrong about an Aristotelian 
commitment to (2) rather than (1) then my arguments for [A] are in trouble. I guess this is 
something that we can talk about in discussion – I’m not confident on what to think at 
present.  
 
Further argument in support of (2) emerges when we turn from assessing the plausibility of 
[A] to the plausibility of [B] 
[B] In acquiring the X-related virtue(s) through practice someone must often act in ways 
which express a decision to X while knowing that they will not succeed in X-ing well. 
along with its more clumsy expansion 
[B1] In acquiring the X-related virtue(s) through practice someone must often act in ways 
which are motivated by a desire to X which is the result of working out that doing that 
is the best or only way to attain the goal of X-ing, while knowing that they will not 
succeed in X-ing well 
 
For one component of [B] and [B1] says exactly what (2) says: that an apprentice acquiring 
building skill through building has (at least sometimes) to perform actions which express a 
decision to build, and that the new parent acquiring parental virtues has (at least sometimes) 
to perform actions which express a decision to parent well. Once again, why suppose that 
true? 
14 
 
 
Building and parenting are extended and complex projects. In part that is why each requires 
skill or virtue to be performed well. Building well involves co-ordinating a wide range of 
sub-activities (planning foundations, erecting walls etc) and tuning the performance of each 
appropriately to that of the others in order to construct a house as designed. Building skill 
enables the trained builder to work out what is required for building well, and to connect that 
with something feasible and practicable in the here and now. That involves deliberative 
sensitivity – the ability to select and focus appropriately on the various relevant 
considerations (to think about the right things and to give them the right weight). The novice 
is trying to acquire that deliberative sensitivity, so that they can act as the expert acts and with 
the insight the expert has, and thereby alight on actions which are optimised for the internal 
goal of the project at hand – and they are doing so by practice (learning to build by building, 
learning to parent by parenting). Now if the novice’s practice is to be successful then it must 
(somehow) make the apprentice aware of how it is that the differential exercise of the various 
sub-abilities involved in building contributes to achieving the internal goal of building skill. It 
is only if the apprentice becomes thus aware that she will understand how to adjust the 
exercise of those different sub-abilities so as to contribute to the internal goal of the project at 
hand. And only if she understands that will she be able to deliberate and work back from that 
internal goal to see what’s required for exercising this particular sub-ability right now (eg 
mixing the sand, cement and water into mortar of the right consistency and properties for the 
house under construction). If the apprentice’s mixing the mortar in such and such proportions 
were always externally motivated, say by a desire to do what the expert says, or to follow the 
instructions in the builder’s manual, then it will not be tracking the deliberative sensitivity 
required to work it out for herself. At a certain stage of practice the apprentice needs to mix 
just this much sand, cement and water because she conceives of doing that as the best 
contribution to the internal goal of the project: building well. That is to say, at a certain stage 
of her practice the apprentice needs to start making decisions for herself rather than following 
instructions or guessing. For decisions are characterised by being arrived at in a certain way, 
and what the apprentice needs to do is to alight on feasible courses of action in that way 
rather than in any of the other ways in which one could alight on a course of action which 
merely coincides with the action which would be decided upon
19
.  That gives one component 
                                               
19 Isn’t this how it must appear to the novice? See NE 2.4, 1105a26-30 “Again the case of the arts and that of the 
[virtues] are not similar; for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that 
they should have a certain character, but if the acts that are in accordance with the [virtues] have themselves a 
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of [B] and [B1]: in acquiring the constructive virtues (ie those of the good builder) through 
building an apprentice must often perform actions which express a decision to build. And 
likewise mutatis mutandis for the agent acquiring the parental virtues through practice 
 
What about the other component of [B] and [B1], which says that the apprentice knows that 
they will not succeed in doing what it is that they need to be doing, namely performing 
actions which express a decision to build? What the apprentice knows is that she will not 
succeed in building well; that is, in building as the expert would; that is, in building in such a 
way as displays the right sensitivity in focusing on the right sub-tasks and tuning their 
performance correctly to the goal of producing a house. They know that they will not succeed 
in that because they know they are a novice and not an expert. Consequently they know that 
they lack full understanding of how and why variations in mortar consistency contribute to 
building a house well. And since they know that they lack that understanding they cannot 
draw on that understanding in order to deliberate to a particular way of mixing the mortar, 
and so their actions will not be an instance of building well. Again, likewise mutatis mutandis 
for the novice developing the parental virtues through practice. 
 
 
3. A Solution 
 
What to say? The problem raised by the conflict between [A] and [B] is in part a sceptical 
one. The dialectical pressure is generated by [B], and in particular by its focus on the 
following (sceptical) question addressed to the novice in the course of practice: “if you were 
to ask yourself, as you now perform F and thereby express a decision to X, whether your 
doing F does express a decision to X, what answer should you give?” The moral of the 
preceding section was that the novice (the building apprentice, the new parent) should answer 
that she knows her doing F will not express a decision to X (since she knows that she is a 
novice and not an expert, and so cannot have deliberated as required in order to X well as an 
expert would – since she knows she does not possess the virtue she aspires to acquire). But 
notice the presupposition of that question (‘if you were to ask yourself as you now perform 
F’); and the support I offered for the novice’s answer (‘since she knows that she is a novice 
                                                                                                                                                  
certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately”. The parent is aiming to develop 
parental virtue. and in that case – by contrast to the arts – the goodness is not just in the product. The new parent 
doesn’t just want the results of parental virtue (the outcomes which result from decisions which manifest 
parental virtue) – they want parental virtue.   
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and not an expert’). My suggestion now is that the best response to the conflict between [A] 
and [B] is, in effect, to deny that presupposition and remove that support. We acknowledge 
that if a novice asks themselves whether their acting thus and so, here and now, does manifest 
a decision (to X) then they should conclude that they know it doesn’t. But the consequence to 
draw is that a novice must not ask themselves that question. Further if, as she acts, the novice 
makes herself aware of her novitiate status (‘I am a novice and not an expert’) then the 
sceptical question will inevitably arise. And so the novice must not be aware of her novitiate 
status as she acts in the course of developing the X-related virtues through practice (acquiring 
the X-related virtue through repeatedly X-ing well). I will refer to this as the self-blind novice 
response. 
 
This response is parallel to a possible approach to sceptical problems concerning theoretical 
knowledge. We have certain ways of acquiring theoretical knowledge (eg if I wish to acquire 
knowledge of the colours of apples, then (roughly) I get hold of the apples, bring them into 
good light, and look at them). And there are considerations which, if I reflect on them, will 
logically block my acquisition of theoretical knowledge in that way. For example, if, as I hold 
the apple in front of my eyes, I reflect that I could be a brain in a vat – more generally, if I 
run through sceptical arguments to myself - then my knowledge acquisition will be blocked. 
What conclusion should we draw from that? Not that we should give in to these sceptical 
challenges to the acquisition of theoretical knowledge, but rather that we should not reflect on 
these sceptical challenges as we go about acquiring theoretical knowledge of the world. In the 
words of Bernard Williams: “reflection might destroy knowledge”20 
 
The situation is much the same as regards practical knowledge. We have certain ways of 
acquiring practical knowledge (eg if I want to know how to build or how to parent well then I 
practice). Part of what that involves is acting in ways which express decisions. But there are 
questions which, if I reflect on them, will block that process. In order to acquire the virtues I 
want, I have (at some stage) to act in ways which express decisions (first component of [B]); 
if I know that the action I’m performing isn’t an act of X-ing well then I can’t in thus acting 
be expressing a decision to X; but if the question arises then I do know that the virtue-
acquiring action I’m now performing isn’t an act of X-ing well. The conclusion to draw is not 
                                               
20
 Williams 1985/2011 pp.164, 185 
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that virtues aren’t inculcated through practice (they obviously are21), but that we must not go 
in for those reflections (just as we must not reflect on sceptical possibilities when gathering 
information about the world)
22
. 
 
Notice finally where the self-blind novice response leaves us as regards the contrast 
mentioned earlier between these two claims regarding what is required of someone for virtue 
acquisition  
(1) A novice developing the X virtue needs repeatedly to perform actions which are such 
that the expert would in fact also decide on those actions. 
(2) A novice developing the X virtue needs to make decisions in the way that the expert 
would make them. 
The earlier worry – to rehearse it here – was that while Aristotle was committed to (1), he 
was not committed to (2); but it was (2) that I appealed to in my argument for the plausibility 
of [A]; so that argument fails, and the interesting tension between [A] and [B] does not arise 
for an Aristotelian account of virtue acquisition. My reaction to this worry was to claim that 
an Aristotelian should be committed to (2) rather than (1). For endorsing (1) forces one to 
claim that  
(1*) repeatedly acting in ways that don’t express a decision to X can bring one to being the 
sort of person whose actions do express a decision to X 
whereas adoption of (2) would instead license 
(2*) repeatedly acting in ways that do express a decision to X can bring one to being the 
sort of person whose actions do express a decision to X. 
And my argument was then that (2*) constitutes a less mysterious account of virtue 
acquisition than does (1*), and an account which cleaves closer to Aristotle’s formulaic 
statement on the topic at NE 2.1, 1103b21-22: that “states arise out of like activities” (ek tôn 
homoiôn hexeis ginontai). 
                                               
21 NE 3.5, 1114a8-10 “Now not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states 
of character are produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person” 
 
22
 This would not be interesting if it were a point simply about human psychology - that our confidence drains 
away if our status as beginners is too apparent to us. But it is no more a matter of psychology than is the parallel 
point about theoretical knowledge. There is indeed a merely psychological point which could be made about 
theoretical knowledge. Suppose I am taking a multiple choice biology exam, and that as the questions come up, 
answers strike me. It may very well be that if I pause at every question, and ask myself how I know that’s the 
answer, and where that answer came from, then my confidence will evaporate. But the conflict between [A] and 
[B] is not a matter of psychology. There is a conceptual difficulty facing anyone who seeks to develop the X-
related virtue through acting in ways which express a decision to X while knowing that they will thereby not be 
X-ing well. 
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Now that may well have seemed a fishy argument at the time, if only because (2*) itself looks 
patently paradoxical. It appears to require that a novice, who cannot make the appropriate 
decisions, comes to be someone, an expert, who can make the appropriate decisions by means 
of repeatedly making the appropriate decisions. But with the self-blind novice strategy on the 
table we are now in a position – as promised - to replace (2*) by something more nuanced. 
For the upshot of that strategy is to insert a clause into (2*) to give 
(2**) repeatedly acting in ways that do express a decision to X, so long as the question of 
whether they express a decision to X is not raised, can bring one to being the sort of 
person whose actions do express a decision to X. 
Of course (2**) may seem no more attractive than (2*). But the reason it is supposed to be so 
is that it builds into the account of virtue acquisition what I see at the core of the response to 
the practically sceptical problem which drives the tension between [A] and [B]. Acting in 
ways that express decisions is the significant difference between the virtuous and those 
developing towards virtue. Aristotle is correct to say that we acquire the virtues though 
practice. But there is a prima facie problem which turns on the possibility of raising a certain 
practically sceptical problem. The conclusion is that that problem must not be raised (for 
conceptual reasons), and that the moral student must not be aware of their student status. And 
(2**) sums all that up, in making it plain that whether or not some action of mine does 
express a decision can rest (among other things) on whether or not I am self-aware 
concerning my possession of what is required in order to make a decision. 
 
 
4. Exceptional Virtue 
 
How does any of this connect with anything we might expect to find in Aristotle? The tension 
between [A] and [B] arises for those engaged in development (moral or otherwise) through 
practice – acquiring the virtue which enables one to X well through repeatedly X-ing well.  
But how common are moral developers in the Aristotelian ethical scheme? Again this is 
contested, and I claim no decisive contribution to the debate. But there are those who 
advocate a ‘realistic’ reading of Aristotle’s treatment of the virtues, in contrast to the 
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widespread ‘idealising’ approaches23 according to which the virtuous agent24 is a practically 
unattainable paragon – a person who, for example, never voluntarily performs a bad action25, 
and who always and in every situation thinks of and prefers what virtue requires
26
. These 
more ‘realistic’ interpretations seek to accommodate texts in which Aristotle talks about 
virtuous agents in graded terms, much more familiar from our experience of the ways in 
which moral virtue shows up in the complexities of human life; and texts in which he appears 
to countenance ethical development
27. Further, someone taking a ‘realistic’ as opposed to 
‘idealising’ approach to Aristotle’s characterisation of the virtuous agent and the (different?) 
virtues would think that moral development might be common among virtuous people; and 
therefore that refraining from explicit ethical self-assessment, as recommended by the self-
blind novice response, should be pervasive in the lives of those Aristotelian agents who are 
‘ordinarily’ virtuous.  
 
But on any reading of Aristotle’s account of the virtues there certainly is a type who can face 
the sceptical question “if you were to ask yourself as you now perform F and thereby express 
a decision to X, whether your doing F does express a decision to X, what answer should you 
give?” This is the person who possesses the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity 
                                               
23 The terminology of an ‘idealization interpretation’ as contrasted with a ‘realistic interpretation’ is due to 
Curzer 2005. 
 
24 A monolith, if we emphasise opaque claims such as (i) it is not possible to possess any individual virtue 
without possessing phronêsis, and (ii) possession of phronêsis brings possession of every other moral virtue. 
See NE 6.13, 1144b30-1145a6.  
 
25 NE 4.9, 1128b28-29 
 
26 NE 1.10, 1100b18-20 
 
27 See for example NE 10.3 1173a18-21 where Aristotle refers to “justice and the other [virtues] in respect of 
which we plainly say that people of a certain character are so more or less, and act more or less in accordance 
with these [virtues]; for people may be more just or brave, and it is possible also to act justly or temperately 
more or less”. Or this optimistic remark on the prodigal agent at NE 4.1, 1121a20-27: “For he (sc the prodigal) 
is easily cured by age and by poverty, and thus he may move towards the middle state. For he has the 
characteristics of the liberal man, since he both gives and refrains from taking, though he does neither of these in 
the right manner or well. Therefore if he were brought to do so by habituation or in some other way, he would 
be liberal; for he will then give to the right people, and will not take from the wrong sources. That is why he 
thought not have not a bad character; it is not the mark of a wicked or ignoble man to go to excess in giving and 
not taking, but only of a foolish one.” 
Prodigality is the vice of excess which corresponds to the virtue of liberality, on which see NE 4.1 passim. 
According to Aristotle there is something paradoxical about the prodigal’s character. She gives away her money 
far too easily, but is also careless about trying to get money from others. So it’s just a fact of life that such 
prodigals are likely simply to run out of resources. His point in the passage quoted is that while prodigality is a 
vice, prodigals are ‘in no small degree better’ (1121a20) than the mean and stingy (1121a11-29). 
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(megalopsychia)
28. For this virtue is unique in Aristotle’s catalogue in that it is characterised 
in terms of two components, one of which comprises awareness of the other
29
.  On the one 
hand there is the exceptional degree of virtue possessed by the magnanimous agent; on the 
other there is the magnanimous agent’s correct self-evaluation, that she does indeed possess 
virtue to this exceptional degree
30. The magnanimous agent is the “best (man)”31 and knows 
it.  
 
Consider now what follows from Aristotle’s views about what would be involved in being the 
best and knowing it. It helps here to take Aristotle’s discussion of magnanimity within the 
broader context of the first four chapters of NE 4. There are four topics: Liberality (4.1), 
Magnificence (4.2), Magnanimity (megalopsychia) (4.3), a nameless virtue (4.4). These four 
virtues display a pattern
32
. They fall into two pairs. First liberality and magnificence, second 
magnanimity and the nameless virtue.  In each case one of the pairs is a large scale cognate of 
the other
33
. Liberality is the virtue which concerns the right attitude to wealth (something 
                                               
28 From here on I follow Irwin 1999 in translating megalopsychia as ‘magnanimity’. This is a departure from the 
ROT, in which Ross/Urmson 1984 have ‘pride’; but that has slightly negative connotations. Rowe 2002 and 
Taylor 2006 both opt for ‘greatness of soul’ which displays the structure of the Greek term wonderfully but is a 
little unwieldy, particularly given the absence of a natural cognate English term corresponding to the adjective 
‘magnanimous’. 
For recent discussions of magnanimity see the commentaries of Irwin 1999, Broadie 2002 and Taylor 2006, and 
for greater detail Hardie 1978, Sherman 1988, Curzer 1990, Curzer 1991, Bae 2003, Stover and Polansky 2003, 
Pakaluk 2004 and Russell 2012. 
 
29 For the point about uniqueness see Taylor 2006, 217. Notice that magnanimity differs significantly in this 
respect from truthfulness, the nameless virtue of NE 4.7, which is the mean between boastfulness and mock-
modesty; the person possessing that virtue is “truthful both in life and word owning to what he has, and neither 
more nor less” (1127a23-26). Truthfulness does indeed involve an awareness of something (ie one’s worth), but 
what it requires awareness of (eg one’s courageous and temperate behaviour) isn’t itself part of the virtue of 
truthfulness. Magnanimity by contrast involves reflexive self-awareness. Being magnanimous in itself involves 
being aware that one is magnanimous. It shouldn’t be surprising that magnanimity in unique in this regard 
though. The reason is that magnanimity concerns dealing correctly with honour, which requires one to recognise 
deserved honour, which takes one to virtue as the subject matter for magnanimity. There is no object for a virtue 
other than honour which would lead so directly to virtue itself as an object. I can have great wealth, and 
recognise that I have great wealth, without having a view about my own state of character (my virtues). What I 
can’t have, in the absence of a view about my virtues, is a correct attitude to honour. 
 
30 NE 4.3, 1123b1-2, 13-15, 26-30 
 
31 NE 4.3, 1123b27 aristos. It’s not essential to the virtue of magnanimity that there be a single ‘most virtuous’ 
agent as it were. It’s more that the magnanimous agent has no better to get. She is as good as it can be with 
humans (or whatever kind). And there’s nothing necessarily elitist about that, because it’s not necessarily false 
that all humans could attain the acme (though given lots of facts about the world, in fact not all humans can 
realistically attain the acme).  
 
32 NE 4.4, 1125b 1-6 
 
33
 ‘Large scale’ is used as a term of art, following the literature (eg Gardiner 2001). ‘Cognate to’ is novel 
terminology. It is intended to be taken as neutrally as possible as regards the vexed question of what the relation 
21 
 
commonly pursued as a good). Magnificence is the virtue which disposes one correctly 
towards great wealth (wealth on the large scale)
34
. Another very general good pursued by 
human beings is honour: being perceived by others as one merits, deserved good reputation
35
. 
And there are a pair of virtues which dispose one correctly towards small scale and large 
scale honours. The former is the nameless virtue of NE 4.4, the latter is magnanimity. 
Aristotle turns first in NE 4.3 to the large scale cognate. He starts by working out the content 
of a virtue which disposes us well as regards the greatest honours. Honour is noble only if it 
is deserved or merited
36
. So the magnanimous agent is someone who deserves the greatest 
honours. In that case she must be someone of the greatest virtue, since what merits honour is 
precisely virtue
37
 (what good person would want to be honoured by the vicious?)
 
The virtue 
of magnanimity disposes one well towards being someone of the greatest virtue. How could 
someone go wrong in regard to this issue? Aristotle’s thought is that one might not recognise 
that one is of the greatest virtue. There are two ways in which that non-recognition could be 
                                                                                                                                                  
is between eg generosity and magnificence. There is considerable debate about whether Aristotle can count eg 
generosity and magnificence as distinct virtues (Irwin 1988, Kraut 1988, Halper 1999, Gardiner 2001, Pakaluk 
2002, Drefcinski 2006).  
 
34 NE 2.7 1107b18-19 
 
35 NE 1.5, 1095b22-1096a4. 
 
36 NE 4.3 1123b1-2: the magnanimous person “thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy of great 
things”; and 1123b16 “he deserves and claims great things”. See also NE 1.4, 1095b26-31: it is this point about 
honour which puts paid to the life of honour as an account of happiness.  
 
37 One might form the impression that what is essential to magnanimity is the undertaking of grand projects, of a 
scale which would be beyond most people (NE 4.3, 1124b22-26), due to their lacking the resources and power 
to instigate and carry through grand projects. And that impression might be reinforced by Aristotle’s remarks on 
the contribution made by “goods of fortune” to magnanimity (NE 4.3, 1124a23-28). But the impression should 
be resisted. Aristotle’s views on the magnanimous agent’s attitude to wealth and power are nuanced. He doesn’t 
deny that people will in fact honour the wealth and power of a magnanimous person, if the person is indeed – as 
they may often be – wealthy and powerful. Indeed, since Aristotle thinks that virtue typically brings success and 
happiness, it is perhaps only to be expected that the magnanimous will in fact be wealthy and powerful. But 
even when the magnanimous are wealthy and powerful it is not the possession of wealth and power which 
makes them deserving of honour, but rather their virtue (NE 4.3, 1224a26-28). Indeed wealth and power are not 
essential to magnanimity, for the magnanimous agent’s virtue enables her to take the right attitude to wealth and 
power – to use them well if possessed (NE 4.3, 1124b1-2), but to take the appropriate attitude to their absence 
(NE 4.3, 1124a11-19). And it seems that Aristotle would count Socrates as a magnanimous person, although he 
was neither wealthy nor powerful – although that point has to be extracted from an example in Posterior 
Analytics 2.13, 97b16-24. (The point in Posterior Analytics 2.13 is this. Suppose you want to enquire what F is; 
then gather together a group of F items, and see what they have in common; and then gather another group of F 
items; if there is nothing further common to the first and the second F group then F will not be a unified kind, 
and there will be two types of F. Aristotle’s example takes Alcibiades, Achilles and Ajax as magnanimous (in 
virtue of their intolerance of insults); and then Lysander and Socrates as magnanimous (in virtue of their 
indifference to good and bad fortune). If there were nothing in common between intolerance of insults and 
indifference to fortune then there would be two types of magnanimity. But there is no sign in NE 4.3 (the 
canonical treatment of magnanimity) of the virtue being this bifurcated. So we can conclude that Aristotle takes 
Socrates to be magnanimous). 
22 
 
manifest. Someone might think that they are of the greatest virtue when in fact they’re not 
(the over-estimator, the ‘vain’ person); or someone might not think they are of the greatest 
virtue when in fact they are (the under-estimator, the ‘unduly humble’ person)38. 
Correspondingly the core of the magnanimous person’s virtue is that they correctly estimate 
that they are of the greatest virtue. Since the magnanimous agent is of the greatest virtue then 
they are unimprovable, the acme of moral development. And since the magnanimous agent is 
aware that they are of the greatest virtue (as they must be, given that they are able correctly to 
estimate themselves of the greatest virtue), they know they are unimprovable. The 
magnanimous agent is aware that moral development is neither required nor possible. The 
magnanimous agent is someone for whom the conflict between [A] and [B] poses no threat, 
since they can confidently answer the sceptical question “are you, in your current X-ing, X-
ing well?” in the positive (‘yes, as well as it can be done’). The self-awareness of the 
magnanimous agent is a dual to the self-blindness required of the novice by the conflict 
between [A] and [B]. The magnanimous agent could know, should she care to think about it, 
that her each and every action really is an expression of virtue; there would be no conceptual 
difficulty should there be an inner voice of self-congratulation accompanying her actions. But 
most agents in the Aristotelian scheme are not magnanimous. They are, at a practicable best, 
virtuous. They do (and should) recognise that there are greater lives than their own. They are 
vulnerable to the tension between [A] and [B]. The best response to that tension, for someone 
for whom moral development is a possibility, is to ignore the corrosive sceptical question by 
which it is generated: does this (virtue developing) act of X-ing express a decision to X? Of 
course that is not in everyday activity a difficult question to ignore. Perhaps that is part of the 
reason why Aristotle finds it difficult to offer anything particularly definitive of the nameless 
virtue (NE 4.4) which stands to magnanimity (NE 4.3) as liberality (NE 4.1) stands to 
magnificence (NE 4.2)
39
. 
                                               
38 NE 4.3, 1125a16-18: the vice of excess is being vain, that of deficit being ‘unduly humble.. It is striking that 
Aristotle refers to each as lacking in self-knowledge. The unduly humble person seems ‘also not to know 
himself (kai agnoein d’ heauton) 1125a21-22; and vain people are ‘fools and ignorant of themselves, and that 
manifestly’ (êlithioi kai heautous agnoountes , kai taut’ epiphanôs) 1125a27-28. Talk of self-ignorance is not 
common in Aristotle’s catalogue of the virtues (NE 3.6-4.9). In particular, there is no reference to self-ignorance 
in NE 4.7’s characterisation of those who are boastful and those who are mock-modest . The boastful man of NE 
4.7 makes excessive claims, the mock-modest man makes insufficiently strong claims; the truthful man neither 
exaggerates nor understates the worth or significance of his actions. But given that the truthful man is not, as 
such, magnanimous, his self-estimate should be limited; at the very least he should realise that human life holds 
greater honours than those to which he can possibly lay claim; he should be aware that there are human lives 
better than his (eg the lives of those who deserve the merits to which the boastful wrongfully lay claim). By 
contrast the magnanimous person knows himself to be morally unimprovable. 
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